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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

ALFRED P. KATOA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981699-CA
Priority No. 2

:
ARGUMENT

ISSUE: THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING APPELLANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WITHOUT
ADEQUATELY CONSIDERING STATUTORY MITIGATING FACTORS.
The State asserts on appeal that the sentencing court did
not abuse its discretion in consecutively imposing two zero-tofive-year prison sentences on Appellant Alfred P. Katoa ("Katoa")
because it gave due consideration to all the statutory factors
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998).
Brief ("S.B.") at Point I.

See State's

The State also asserts lack of

preservation regarding two points made by Katoa on appeal.
at 17,25-26.

Id.

The State's arguments are without merit.1

A. The State's Analysis is Too Narrow And Does Not
Account For The Broad Range Of Information That A
Sentencing Court Is Bound To Consider In Imposing
Consecutive Or Concurrent Terms.
As an initial matter, in defense of the sentencing court's
decision to impose consecutive sentences upon Katoa, the State
devotes much of its discussion to the indisputably tragic fact
that five people died as a result of the accident caused by Katoa

1

Select arguments set forth by the State will be
addressed herein. Katoa submits on his opening brief in response
to other arguments presented by the State that are not expressly
responded to on reply.

and his co-defendant, Aisea Akauloa ("Akauloa"), then peppers the
remainder of its brief with other allusions to this fact.

See

S.B. Point I.A,B.1,17,25.
The State's emotional argument on appeal eclipses the legal
issue before this Court in the present case, i.e., whether the
sentencing court "may not have given adequate weight to certain
mitigating circumstances."
(Utah 1998) .

State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938

In addition to considering the "gravity of the

circumstances," the sentencing court is bound also

to consider

"the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1998) (stating

presumption for concurrent sentencing unless court determines
consecutive sentencing appropriate under statutorily prescribed
factors); see also Katoa's Opening Brief ("A.B.") at 5-20
(discussing sentencing court's treatment of each statutory
element).
The State does not dispute that the sentencing court is
required to consider all of the factors under section 76-3401(4).

See S.B.9-10.

Nonetheless, arguing that the sentencing

court need not give "equal weight" to each of the factors, the
State defends the sentencing order on the basis that it gave them
due consideration.

S.B.10 (citations omitted).

However, the

State's defense of the court's decision is exceedingly narrow and
does not account for the broad range of information that is both
appropriate and statutorily required for the court to consider.
2

For example, the State argues that the court did not abuse
its discretion simply because "'all the mitigating information
was before the trial court.'"

S.B.9 (quoting A.B.9-10 n.2). The

State's argument misleadingly suggests that Katoa himself
concedes this point on appeal.

In fact, Katoa contests this very

proposition; a sentencing court is not presumed to have given due
consideration to all the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(4)
simply because all the mitigating information is before the it in
one form or another, e.g. through the presentence report ("PSR")
or the testimonies of victims and family members.

See A.B. 9-

10,n.2 (offering discussion under case law). The State offers no
case law in support of its stance, however, beyond the bare
statement that a sentencing court does not abuse its discretion
under section 76-3-401 where all the mitigating information is
before it. See S.B.9.
The State further argues that Katoa admitted in his plea
agreement that he drove under the influence of alcohol and
therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to
consider the fact that Katoa's 0.02 blood alcohol level ("BAL")
was well below the legal limit of .08, and that there was no
quantifiable amount of marijuana metabolite in his system at the
accident scene.

See S.B.13-16.

The State notes in particular

that the offense of automobile homicide, to which Katoa pled,
includes the element of operating a motor vehicle with a BAL of
.08 or under the influence of any combination of alcohol and
drugs "to a degree that renders the actor incapable of safely
3

operating the vehicle."
(1995); S.B.15.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (a)

The State similarly notes Katoa's statement in

his plea admitting that he drove under the influence of alcohol.
R.28; S.B.15.
The category of information that a sentencing court is
allowed to assess in determining the "gravity of the
circumstances," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4), is not as narrowly
constricted as the State suggests.

The language of the

concurrent sentencing statute itself suggests that a court is not
tied to considering the elements of the offense, but rather the
"gravity of the circumstances" surrounding

the offense.

Id.

Indeed, the definition of "circumstance" includes any "fact
accompanying another, either incidentally or as an essential
condition or determining factor."

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
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(2d College Ed. 1979).
Moreover, case law holds that a sentencing court may look
beyond the bare statutory elements of the offenses in assessing
the circumstances of a case, even where a defendant pleas to the
offenses for which he is being sentenced.

In Galli, for example,

the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of
robbery.

967 P.2d at 932.

aggravated

The Utah Supreme Court reversed a

consecutive sentencing order, in part, because the sentencing
court did not consider the fact that the gun used by the
defendant during the commission of the aggravated robberies was a
pellet gun "incapable of inflicting serious injury."
938.

967 P.2d at

The type of gun used is not an element of aggravated
4

robbery, and has no bearing upon guilt for that offense.2

See

also. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) (affirming
consecutive sentencing order where sentencing court found
defendant's crimes to be senseless and brutal, although
senselessness and brutality were not elements of the offenses of
criminal homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended);
attempted criminal homicide, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202, 76-4-101
(1953 as amended); aggravated arson, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103;
aggravated kidnaping, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1953 as
amended); aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-3 02 (1953 as
amended); theft, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 04 (1953 as amended); or
aggravated assault Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953 as amended)).
Accordingly, the State's assertion that the sentencing court
did not abuse its discretion in failing to acknowledge Katoa's
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1998) provides: "(1) A
person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, by means of force or fear; or (b) the person
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force
against another in the course of committing a theft. (2) An act
shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) provides: "(1) A person
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in section 76-1-601; [or] causes serious bodily injury
upon another."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) defines "dangerous
weapon" as "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury; or a facsimile or representation of the item; and: (i)
the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the
victim to reasonable believe the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an
item."
5

BAL that was well within the legal limit, and the fact that there
was non-quantifiable result of marijuana metabolite in his
bloodstream, is not a correct statement of the law regarding the
appropriate range of information that a sentencing court mayconsider in assessing the "gravity of the circumstances."
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4).

Utah

Rather, the court should have, but

erroneously failed to, consider these important mitigating facts
which are appropriate considerations notwithstanding the
technical definition of the elements of the crime of automobile
homicide.

See A.B. at 12-14 (discussing court's inadequate

consideration of the facts in mitigation of the circumstances in
this case).
The State likewise challenges Katoa's argument that his
crimes were not committed with malice.

See S.B.12.

The State

misconstrues Katoa's argument, asserting that it "assume[s] the
legal proposition that the sentencing court abuses its discretion
if it imposes consecutive prison terms for crimes that are not
committed intentionally or maliciously."

Id.

The State mischaracterizes Katoa's argument however.

Katoa

never made such an assertion but rather argued only that the lack
of malice goes to the "gravity of the circumstances."
Ann. § 76-3-401(4); see A.B.12-13.

Utah Code

Moreover, Katoa cites to

Galli, 967 P.2d at 932, 938; State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297,
1301-02 (Utah 1993); and State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244-45
(Utah 1995), to demonstrate that the "incongruity of the
consecutive sentencing order . . . [in light of] other cases,
6

wherein similar orders were vacated [although the defendant's
were convicted of] intentional crimes."

A.B.12.

Accordingly,

contrary to the State's misguided argument on appeal,
consideration of lack of malice is an appropriate mitigating
consideration that should have been, but was not, made by the
court below.

Id.

The State's argument on appeal similarly begs the real issue
in this case, i.e. whether the sentencing court gave "adequate
consideration" to all the factors set forth in section 76-3-401,
to the extent that it contends that "[t]he imposition of
consecutive prison terms is not unprecedented in Utah" or other
jurisdictions, citing State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Whitley, 382 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1964); and State v.
Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986)).

S.B.13.

Katoa does not contest that consecutive sentences may be
appropriate in certain circumstances so long as the sentencing
court gives due consideration to the factors set forth in section
76-3-401(4).

However, none of the cases cited by the State offer

any analysis of the propriety of the consecutive sentences under
section 76-3-401 or similar statutes in Missouri or Alaska.
Instead, they stand for the singular proposition that "'a single
criminal act or episode may constitute as many offenses as there
are victims'" without violating Double Jeopardy.

Gambrell. 814

P.2d at 1140 (quotation omitted); see also Whitley, 382 S.W.2d at
667; Dunlop, 721 P.2d at 609-10.

Accordingly, the cases cited by

the State offer no guidance as to whether the sentencing court in
7

this case gave "adequate weight" to the specific circumstances of
Katoa's case.

Galli, 967 P.2d at 938.

With regard to the sentencing court's duty to adequately
consider Katoa's "rehabilitative needs," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3401(4), the State asserts that the court did not abuse its
discretion because the sentence does not "rob the Board of
Pardons [("Board")] of its discretion to adjust the actual time
defendant serves in prison."

S.B.24.

The State's analysis, however, does not address all aspects
of the rationale underlying the requirement that a court consider
the rehabilitative needs of a defendant.

The Galli decision

indicates that rehabilitative needs merit consideration
independent of considerations going to the Board's flexibility.
In that case, the Supreme Court looked first to the fact that the
defendant exhibited positive characteristics indicating that he
was a good candidate for rehabilitation.

967 P.2d at 93 8.

Indeed, the defendant's rehabilitative needs took precedence over
the consideration of the Board's flexibility in determining the
length of the sentence.

Id.

The primary concern given to a defendant's rehabilitative
needs indicated in Galli reflects the realities of sentencing and
therefore constitutes better policy.

A sentencing court's

determination to impose consecutive sentences carries weight with
the Board and is likely to influence the Board's decision to keep
an inmate incarcerated for a longer period of time.

Conversely,

a court's imposition of concurrent sentences is likely to
8

persuade the Board to release an inmate earlier than it might
have otherwise.

Therefore, as a matter of policy, it is

important that a defendant enter into the prison system with the
appropriate sentence because it impacts his case in the eyes of
the Board of Pardons.

Hence, the State's emphasis on the Board's

flexibility in this case is misplaced under Galli, 967 P.2d at
938.
B. The Sentencing Court Abused It's Discretion In
Basing It's Decision On An Erroneous Factual Finding.
i.

The Issue Is Properly Before This Court.

The State contends that Katoa did not preserve his challenge
to the sentencing court's false and, therefore, legally erroneous
factual finding that he "had been arrested, convicted and
sentenced for drinking crimes."

R.76[24]; see S.B.17-18.

The

State argues in particular that Katoa never "apprisfed] the
sentencing court of the inaccuracy or otherwise rais[ed] the
issue either at the time the sentencing court made the
misstatement or in his Motion to Correct Sentence."

S.B.17-18.

The State's preservation argument is without merit.

To

"preserve [] [an] issue for appeal, [a party] must have raised the
claim such that the sentencing court had 'an opportunity to rule
on the issue' and make an adequate record for appellate review."
State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992)).

Where a sentencing

court has had an opportunity to address a claim of error, "the
justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened
considerably."

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah
9

1991) .
The Utah Supreme Court in Smith, 909 P.2d at 244, held that
"it is appropriate for a reviewing court to construe an objection
to embrace issues reasonably included within the scope of the
objection."

Accordingly, a reviewing court looks to the overall

context of a case and precludes review only where the arguments
presented below bear no cognizable or reasonable relation to the
issues presented on appeal.

See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862,

874 (Utah 1993) (defendant did not waive appeal where grounds for
objection were apparent from context); see also State v.
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1989) (sentencing objection
that evidence lacked foundation was not appealable on prejudice
grounds); State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 155 n.3 (Utah App. 1994)
(declining review based on alleged violation of confrontation
right where objection at trial was based on relevance); State v.
Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App. 1992) (declining review
under Rule 4 04 where defendant objected at trial on grounds of
improper form, assuming facts, irrelevance, and Rule 403
exclusion); State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App. 1990)
(appeal precluded where defendant objected to evidence as leading
at trial, not as inadmissible under Rule 608 and State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)).
Under the foregoing principles of preservation, Katoa's
challenge to the false finding is properly before this Court.
First, Katoa's initial request for concurrent sentencing at the
July 20, 1998, sentencing hearing necessarily assumes an
10

objection to the court's final order for consecutive sentences
and all of the court's findings in support thereof.

This is

especially true where, as here, Katoa did not stipulate to any of
the findings made by the court either below or on appeal.
Compare State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 359 n.5 (Utah App. 1996)
(defendant conceded that "the gravity of the circumstances . . .
weigh against concurrent sentences" and that the "trial court for
the most part acted within proper bounds in assessing Montoya's
history and character").

Moreover, in this context, it runs

counter to the efficient administration of justice to require a
party to articulate an objection to each and every finding in
support of such a final order on the record when the nature of
the hearing itself implies an objection to consecutive sentencing
on any ground the court might find.
In addition, contrary to the State's assertion, Katoa's
challenge to the false factual finding is likewise implicit in
his written motion to correct the sentence filed on July 28,
1998.

See R.51-53.

In that motion, Katoa explicitly argued that

the consecutive sentences were not legal in part because his
"prior record included only [] misdemeanors."

R.52.

The

misdemeanors that Katoa referred to were set forth in the PSR and
included one misdemeanor conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, plus various convictions for battery,
assault, obstruction, resisting arrest, and vandalism.
10] .

R.75[9-

His misdemeanor record did not include any convictions for

"drinking crimes" as the sentencing court found at the sentencing
11

hearing.

R.76[24].

Given that the PSR was available at all

times to the sentencing court for review, Katoa's objection to
the false factual finding regarding his non-existent "drinking
crimes" is sufficiently apparent from his written motion to
correct sentence, the PSR, and the overall context of these
proceedings, as well as clear from the record itself.
That the erroneous factual finding issue is adequately
preserved in this case is underscored by the fact that, in the
specific context of sentencing issues decided pursuant to section
76-3-401, a sentencing court is presumed to be aware of all the
mitigating information before it in the form of the PSR,
arguments made by the defendant, and letters or testimony from
victims, family members, counselors.3

See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938

(reversing consecutive sentencing order where court did not give
"adequate weight" to information before it); see also A.B.9-10
n.2 (discussing case law indicating that sentencing courts are
presumed to be aware of all mitigating information in a case).
It follows, therefore, that the sentencing court had an adequate
opportunity to correct its error when Katoa challenged the
consecutive sentences on the basis that his record "included only
prior misdemeanors," R.52, and not the "drinking crimes" that the
sentencing court erroneously referred to in its findings.
R.76 [24] .

3

As noted in footnote 2 of Katoa's opening brief, however,
a sentencing court's awareness of mitigating information does not
necessarily assume it's adequate consideration of that
information. See A.B.9-10 n.2.
12

Even assuming for the sake of argument only that Katoa had
not adequately preserved this issue for appeal, this Court could
still review the claim for manifest injustice.
Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998).

See State v.

"When reviewing a

claim of manifest injustice, [reviewing courts] generally use the
same standard that is applied to determine whether plain error
exists under rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence [(1998)]."
Id. (citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989)).
"That standard is two-pronged.
'obvious.'

'First, the error must be

Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude

that it affects the substantial rights of a party.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)).
In the present case, the error is "obvious."
P.2d at 1226.

Rudolph, 970

The sentencing court found that Katoa had a

history of "drinking crimes," but the PSR clearly indicates, in a
section titled "Adult Record," that Katoa has no prior conviction
for any alcohol offenses.

R.75[9-10].

As noted above, the

sentencing court was aware of the PSR since it was part of the
record.

R.75.

In fact, the sentencing court made statements

during the sentencing hearing indicating that it had read the PSR
and noted Katoa's criminal history.

For example, the court

stated at one point that "Mr. Akauloa's record is significantly
worse than Mr. Katoa's. Mr. Akauloa had a very similar incident
within just a couple of years of this incident.
much higher blood alcohol level than Mr. Katoa."

He also had a
R.76[ll].

The

court could not have commented on these mitigating aspects of the
13

case if it had not read through the PSR, notably the section
regarding Katoa's criminal history.

Accordingly, the court's

false factual finding is "obvious" for purposes of review for
manifest injustice.

Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1226.

In addition, "the error [is] of sufficient magnitude that it
affects [Katoa's] substantial rights."

Id.

It is axiomatic that

procedural due process requires that sentencing determinations be
based upon truthful and accurate factual information.

See U.S.

Const, amend. V, XIV; Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1102 (Utah
1994); State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993); State
v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986).

"Beyond the issue of

accuracy, there is also a concern for legitimacy that has always
animated due process doctrine in the criminal law.

Justice

Marshall [of the U.S. Supreme Court stated,] '[T]his Court has
stressed the importance of adopting procedures that preserve the
appearance of fairness and the confidence of inmates in the
decisionmaking process.'"

Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons,

870 P.2d 902, 910 (Utah 1993) (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 34, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668
(1979)).
In the present case, Katoa is being held on consecutive
prison terms based on a false factual finding that he had a
history of "drinking crimes."

R.76[24].

Not only does this

amount to a violation of his right to procedural due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, but it undermines the legitimacy of his sentence.
14

Accordingly, the error in this case affects Katoa's "substantial
rights" and is of "sufficient magnitude" to merit review of this
issue for manifest injustice.
ii•

Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1226.

The Erroneous Factual Finding Merits Reversal.

The State contends that the "challenged statement, when
viewed in light of the court's entire remarks at sentencing, was
simply an observation that both defendants had committed
substance abuse crimes" and was "harmless at worst" given
additional information before the court regarding Katoa's
criminal past.

S.B.18-19.

The State's argument is disingenuous; the factual finding is
not a mere "observation that both defendants had committed
substance abuse crimes . . . [with] no particular emphasis []
placed on either type of offense."

S.B.18.

First, factual

findings are the empirical basis of a court's legal decision, in
this case, the legal decision to impose consecutive sentencing.
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (facts
constitute the "empirical" basis of a legal decision).

Moreover,

this particular factual finding is not a vague or ambiguous
comment upon Katoa's general
State suggests.

use of controlled substances as the

Rather, the court made an unambiguous and

explicit finding that "both [Katoa and Akauloa] had been
arrested, convicted and sentenced for drinking
crimes."

crimes

and

drug

R.76[24].

The State further dismisses the court's false finding as
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"harmless" because "the PSI included other evidence, unchallenged
by defendant, that supported the court's concern regarding
defendant's past substance abuse" and his prior alcohol use.
S.B.19.

However, this fact is immaterial to the issue concerning

the false finding that Katoa had a history of drinking crimes.
The issue in this matter does not concern whether Katoa had prior
convictions for substance abuse.

In fact, to the extent that

substance abuse refers to drug use,4 Katoa acknowledged that he
had a prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of a controlled
substance dating back to 1995 when he lived in California.
A.B.7 n.l.

Moreover, this issue does not concern Katoa's use of

alcohol in the past.
R.75[14] .

See

He admitted that as well in the PSR.

The issue concerns only

an alcohol related offense.

whether Katoa was convicted

of

The PSR indicates clearly that he

was not, R.75[9-10], and therefore the sentencing court's false
finding cannot be justified based on the arguments set forth by
the State on appeal.
C. Katoa's Argument Under Article I, Section 9 Of The
Utah Constitution Is Properly Raised On Appeal.
The State argues that Katoa's claim that the consecutive
prison terms violated his rights under the undue rigor clause of
Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution is without merit
because it was not preserved below, was vaguely discussed on

4

Section 58-37-2 (1) (e) (ii) (1995), defining controlled
substances, provides: "Controlled substance does not include: (A)
distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food."
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appeal, and, in any event, the unnecessary rigor clause does not
apply to "'terms of punishment. '" S.B.25-26 (citing State v.
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 654 (Utah App. 1997)).
As an initial matter, Katoa does not request this Court to
render a decision in terms of Article I, Section 9.

Rather,

Katoa seeks redress under the more general argument that the
sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences where mitigating factors supported concurrent
sentencing.

See A.B.5 (entitling sole issue on appeal as, "The

Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Sentencing Katoa To
Consecutive Sentences").
Moreover, Katoa mentioned Article I, Section 9 in order to
highlight to the Court the underlying concerns in this case,
namely that Katoa's sentence was unfair in light of numerous
mitigating factors indicating the propriety of concurrent terms,
and in light of the fact that his codefendant received the same
sentence although, by the sentencing court's own admission,
Akauloa bore more culpability in the matter than Katoa.

See

Point D infra.
Additionally, contrary to the State's assertion, Article I,
Section 9 concerns are implicated in this matter.

The State

cites non-binding dicta from Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654, for the
proposition that Article I, Section 9 is not implicated by a
sentencing court's erroneous decision to impose consecutive
sentencing.

S.B.26.

However, the Utah Supreme Court case of

State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1993) indicates that
17

Article I, Section 9 is, in fact, implicated in this context to
the extent that it addressed the defendant's claim under the
unnecessary rigor clause.

Accordingly, while Katoa is not asking

that this issue be analyzed under Article I, Section 9, there are
Article I, Section 9 concerns underlying Katoa's issue on appeal.
D. The State's Analysis Does Not Address The
Incongruity In Sentencing Katoa To The Same Sentence As
Akauloa Where The Sentencing Court Itself Acknowledged
Akauloa's Greater Culpability And More Serious Criminal
History.
As a final matter, the State's brief does not address the
incongruity in sentencing Katoa and Akauloa to the same
consecutive terms where the court itself acknowledged that
Akauloa had a "significantly worse" criminal history, including a
prior auto accident mirroring this one, R.76[ll,24], and a
greater degree of culpability in this particular matter, namely a
"much higher" BAL that exceeded the legal limit.

R.76[ll].

Indeed, the sentencing court stated that it saw Katoa in a
"different light."

Id.

The incongruity in sentencing in this case underscores the
court's abuse of discretion because it demonstrates exactly how
the court failed to give any weight at all to the mitigating
information in Katoa's case.

Point for point, Katoa's case was

less egregious and more deserving of concurrent sentencing than
Akauloa's case.
legally drunk.

Katoa had a BAL of .02 and therefore was not
R.75[3] ;76 [4] . Akauloa, by contrast, had a BAL

of .11, which exceeded the legal limit of .08.

R.5.

Katoa had a

relatively minor criminal history that ended in 1995, with no
18

convictions in Utah, no juvenile record, no convictions for
reckless driving, and no charges pending at the time of
sentencing.

R.76 [9-10,21-22] .

Katoa, however, as the court

acknowledged twice during sentencing, had a "record [that] shows
much more serious criminal activity in the past and also this
other incident where you were lucky you didn't kill anybody, just
a couple of years before this one."

R.76[23]; see also R.76[ll].

The court summed it up best when it stated, " [i]t is clear that,
particularly Mr. Katoa, is not as evil as some people I see here
in court.»

R.76[23].

The court additionally commended Katoa!s responsibility and
cooperation in this case, recognizing the fact that he cooperated
with police in their investigation, accepted responsibility for
his crime, and expressed "sincere remorse" to the victims1
families.

R.76[23].

On account of these facts, the court said,

"I am going to give you credit for that."

Id.

Yet, despite its own awareness of Katoa's lesser
culpability, and its recognition of Katoa's remorse and
responsible behavior after the accident, the court ordered the
same consecutive sentence that it imposed upon Akauloa.
R.76 [24].

Hence, contrary to its statement on the record, the

court did not give Katoa any "credit" for the mitigating aspects
of his case.

R.76[23].

In short, the court's order underscores

how it failed to give "adequate weight" to legitimate mitigating
factors in this case.

Galli, 967 P.2d at 938.

Accordingly, the

consecutive sentencing order goes against the clear weight of the
19

evidence and thus constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion.
See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing and the arguments set forth in his
opening brief, Katoa respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the lower court's consecutive sentencing order and remand for
concurrent sentencing.
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